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HELPING "CONCERNED





By MARCIA VALIANTE* AND W.A. BOGART**
Broad citizen participation in decision making by administrative bodies is
important in achieving fairness, improving the quality of decisions, and
realizing accountability and legitimacy. Yet such broad participation often
hinges on adequate financial capacity. In this regard, the authors review a
number of mechanisms used for funding citizen participation. These
mechanisms are variations of essentially two models: public funding (direct
and indirect) and direct funding by proponents. The article concludes with a
plea for such mechanisms--even in a time of severe financial restraint-as one
reflection of a vigorous participatory democracy.
Citizens' groups are staffed by concerned volunteers working out of their kitchens ... No
government agency comes even close to a citizens' group in the assiduousness and
efficiency with which they watch their turf.
-from a Greensville Against Serious Pollution (GASP) submission.1
@ 1994, Marcia Valiante and W.A. Bogart.
• Assistant Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of Windsor.
** Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of Windsor. Initial research for this article
was conducted as part of a study of the Intervenor Funding ProjectAct, 1988, S.O. 1988, c. 71, funded
by the Ministries of the Attorney General, Energy, and Environment: see W.A. Bogart & M.
Valiante, Access and Impact: An Evaluation of the Intervenor Funding Project Act, 1988 (Toronto:
Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, 1992). Subsequent research was assisted by Helga
Wintal. The support of the Ontario government is gratefully acknowledged. The opinions
expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the authors.
1 As quoted in W.A. Bogart & M. Valiante, Access and Impact:An Evaluation of the Intervenor
Funding ProjectAct, 1988 (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, 1992) at 142.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Dissatisfaction with and distrust of politicians and legislatures, of
whatever stripe, is at a high. The fall of the Charlottetown Accord
provides a recent, dramatic example.2 Such grumblings throw into relief
attempts to create alternative streams that will respond to issues on
behalf of diverse interests. Courts and litigation have become, by some
estimations, the bright promise. Here, it is claimed, rationality and
principles of justice will prevail, offering a beacon against the lassitude
and compromises-to say nothing of the connivance-of politicians.3 In
2 The Citizens'Forum in 1990-91, as part of attempts at constitutional renewal, heard from
over 400,000 Canadians regarding their views about Canada and its problems. It reported that the
most common complaint of those participating was that they "have lost faith in both the political
process and political leadership." See "Citizens' Forum on Canada's Future" The [Toronto] Globe
and Mail (2 July 1991) A9, as cited in P. Russell, "Canadian Constraints on Judicialization From
Without" (Paper presented at the International Political Science Association Research Committee
on Comparative Judicial Studies, Forli, Italy, June 1992) at 16 [unpublished].
3 See, for example, the work of David Beatty: Putting the Charter to Work Designing a
Constitutional Labour Code (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1987); and Talking Heads
and The Supremes: The Canadian Poduction of Constitutional Review (Toronto: Carswell, 1990).
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Canada, of course, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms4 has propelled
courts forward as "rights" has become the new watchword. But the
Charter has also stirred up long-standing reservations about such
ambitions for judges. Skeptics busy themselves at many
levels-theoretical, empirical, historical-aggregating evidence and
arguments to demonstrate that courts may not meet such high
expectations. Such doubters point to a long record of regressive
judgments concerning the disadvantaged, and to the enervation of
popular participation because of the elitism and mystification of law as
warning signs against turning to the courts. They also focus upon the
expense of lawyers and litigation as creating substantial barriers to the
court system, even if otherwise attractive.5 This last criticism is a matter
to which we will return.
Yet, a different way of countering dissatisfaction with the lack of
participation and influence upon policy making is not to turn away from
legislatures and their emanations but to become more closely involved in
their workings. Such efforts ally themselves with a participatory model
of democracy, which hopes a vigilant and active citizenry will lead to the
common good and remain attentive to a range of interests and rights. 6
One element of this strategy, the funding of diverse interests to not only
participate in administrative decision making, but to do so effectively, is
the subject of this paper.
Administrative decision making expanded enormously in North
America in the decades following the Second World War. As the
volume of regulatory agencies and their decisions grew, so did concern
about the manner in which such decisions were being made. In the late
1960s, a number of assessments criticized agencies charged with
regulating in the "public interest." They were censured for failing to
meet pressing public needs, such as environmental quality, and for
4 Part I of the ConstitutionAc 1982 being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K), 1982, c.
11 [hereinafter Charter].
5 This skepticism arises from a number of places on the political spectrum: see, for example,
R. Knopf & F.L Morton, Charter Politics (Scarborough, Ont.: Nelson, 1992); and M. Mandel, The
Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada (Toronto: Wall & Thompson, 1989). For
an excellent study of the impact of such litigation in the U.S. arguing that it may have actually hurt
the disadvantaged, see G.N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
6 C. Taylor, "Alternative Futures: Legitimacy, Identity and Alienation in Late Twentieth
Century Canada" in A. Cairns & C. Williams, eds., Constitutionalism, Citizensh4p and Society in
Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986) 183.
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failing to serve the majority of the public.7 Others criticized agencies for
being biased in favour of the interests of the regulated industry and
exercising their discretion at the expense of minorities, the poor,
consumers, ratepayers, and other more diffuse interests8 Some of the
reasons cited to explain these biases were the reliance of agencies on
regulated industries for technical data and other information; the need
to ensure industry cooperation in policy implementation; and the
absence of other voices from administrative proceedings, largely because
of the limited resources available to them.9
At the same time, the traditional concept of administrative
agencies as mechanical implementers of legislative mandates which
encompass an objectively rendered "public interest" has disintegrated. 10
Because the "public interest" has come to be seen as a "balance of many
interests," the usual solution to the problem of bias was to throw open
the agencies' doors and allow broad citizen participation.1 Thus, as a
quid pro quo for their validation, agencies attempt to listen to and
consider all interests affected by their decisions.
7 See, for example, E. Gellhorn, "Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings" (1972)
81 Yale LJ. 359.
8 See discussion in R.B. Stewart, "The Reformation of American Administrative Law" (1975)
88 Harv. L. Rev. 1669; and R.C. Cramton, "The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public
Participation in the Administrative Process" (1972) 60 Georgetown L.J. 525 at 525-30.
9 See Stewart, ibU at 1686. Cramton, ibid. at 529 states:
The cardinal fact that underlies the demand for broadened public participation is that
governmental agencies rarely iespond to interests that are not represented in their
proceedings. And they are exposed, with rare and somewhat insignificant exceptions,
only to the view of those who have a sufficient economic stake in a proceeding or
succession of proceedings to warrant the substantial expense of hiring lawyers and expert
witnesses to make a case for them. Noneconomic interests or those economic interests
that are diffuse in character tend to be inadequately represented, although agency staffs
often make valiant efforts in this direction [footnotes omitted].
10 See Stewart, supra note 8 at 1683. Stewart traces a shift in the role of courts in judicial
review that parallels this shift in concept. Judical review shifted from a focus on ensuring that
agencies stay within their legislative directives in order to prevent unauthorized intrusions on
"private autonomy" to a focus on assuring fair representation for all affected interests in the
exercise of delegated power. "Implicit in this development is the assumption that there is no
ascertainable, transcendent 'public interest,' but only the distinct interests of various individuals and
groups in society." Ibid at 1712.
1 1 See discussion in Gellhorn, supra note 7.
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Enthusiasts of expanded citizen participation claim several
advantages, 12 for example, fairness, the quality of decisions, and
accountability and legitimacy.
A. Fairness
Regulatory decisions always affect some segment of the public.
Sometimes individuals are financially affected, each to a small degree, as
with telephone or utility rates. Sometimes individuals' health and well-
being are affected, as with environmental or food and drug regulation.
In principle, if people are affected by decisions, they have the right to be
heard.13
B. Quality of Decisions
Where regulatory decisions affect the public and are required to
be made in the "public interest," the quality of those decisions is
improved when representatives of the affected interests participate.
They can apprise an agency or tribunal of facts that might not otherwise
come to its attention and they can assert different perspectives on and
opinions about the consequences of a decision which challenge those of
the regulated industry. In this way, the agency or tribunal gains a fuller
understanding of the range of dimensions that comprise the "public
interest" it is charged with serving. It is also argued that better decisions
are the result.
C. Accountability and Legitimacy
When representatives of all affected interests participate in
administrative proceedings, they gain an understanding of the balance
12 The rationale for increased citizen participation is considered by many authors. See, for
example, Gellhorn, supra note 7 at 361; D. Fox, Public Particiation in the Administrative Process: A
Study Paper Prepared for the Law Reform Commission (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission, 1979) at
4-6; R. Anand & LG. Scott, "Financing Public Participation in Environmental Decision Making"
(1982) 60 Can. Bar Rev. 81 at 87-96; and R.B. Gibson, "The Value of Participation" in P.S. Elder,
ed., Environmental Management and Public Participation (Toronto: Canadian Environmental Law
Research Foundation and the Canadian Environmental Law Association, 1975).
13 For a discussion of whether the right to participate in decisions affecting one's life or health
is guaranteed by section 7 of the Charter, see M. Jackman, "Rights and Participation: The Use of the
Chater to Supervise the Regulatoiy Process" (1991) 4 CJAJ.-P. 23.
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that is ultimately struck between competing interests in decision making.
This process makes the result more transparent, the decision maker
more accountable to the public, and helps legitimize the decision for
those who participate.
Recognition of the importance and necessity of improved access
has moved governments to open administrative proceedings to more
participants. However, acceptance of a bare right to participate is often
not enough to ensure that the goals of access are met. Participation
must also be effective. Often, in administrative proceedings, members of
the public challenge the proposal of a public sector agency, or a large
private sector business that has substantial financial and human
resources to professionally present a case.14 Individuals and members of
public interest groups generally have fewer resources to contribute.
While public interest groups represent the interests of consumers, fund-
raising results, for example, do not reflect the numbers who benefit from
the group's work because all consumers will benefit even if they do not
contribute directly. This is known as the "free rider effect." In addition,
the costs of participating in an administrative proceeding are much
greater than the individual benefit of a successful intervention.
Accordingly, for participation to be effective in a proceeding
where there is such an imbalance of resources, an attempt to redress that
imbalance is required. In this depiction, financial assistance, provided
directly or indirectly to intervenors, and provided by the government, the
tribunal, or the proponent, is vital for redressing the imbalance. 15
However, responsible use of the funds and relevant and constructive
participation in the proceedings are also critical. This article reviews a
number of such mechanisms.
That such initiatives have weaknesses is a matter that will
become all too clear. Nevertheless, whatever their imperfections, they
stand in marked contrast to the way similar barriers to courts have been
addressed. Legal aid for judicial proceedings has been an important
modification but its focus is on individuals, particularly the very needy,
14 As one commentator claims:
[t]here is a generally perceived imbalance of resources, information,
expertise and familiarity with applications as between the applicant in a
proceeding and the other components of the public interest.
R.W. Macaulay, Practice and Procedure Before Administrative Tribunals, vol. 1 (Toronto:
Carswell, 1988) at 26-2.
15 Other ways of increasing public input include direct government consultation with interest
groups or the creation of a public or consumer advocate to represent diverse interests in
administrative proceedings. Macaulay, ibid at 26-4.
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and especially those facing criminal charges. Apart from these critical
but limited alterations, the overall structure of litigation is that losers pay
winners. As an abstraction, such a rule is attractive in discouraging
frivolous claims and defences and comports with theories of formal
equality. As a reality, it can have a prohibitive impact on individuals and
groups seeking to raise important issues of public policy, particularly
when their adversaries-frequently governments or big
corporations-are far better able to absorb or pass on the costs of such
litigation.
16
It is true that there have been limited attempts to redress such an
imbalance. Good examples are Quebec's 17 and Ontario's18 class action
mechanisms and their costs devices. Nevertheless, possibly the most
important innovation, certainly in terms of Charter litigation, was the
Court Challenges Program. Under this federal programme, a maximum
of $35,000 at each court level was provided to assist individuals and non-
profit groups in bringing or intervening in test cases that raised
important issues relating to the language and equality rights under the
Charter.19 The purpose of the programme was to allow groups intended
to benefit from the Charter to test the meaning of protections and
relevant provisions, "so as to clarify and advance the rights of all
members of the disadvantaged group."20 However, funding for that
programme was eliminated by the federal government in its February
1992 budget. Such a termination can be seen, not as a second thought
about the wonders of litigation, but as a signal to the disadvantaged that
lack of access is not a deficiency of this process, but an unfortunate side
effect for some interests that will be, from now on, their problem. Such
indifference to real court barriers needs to be kept in mind as initiatives
to provide access to administrative proceedings and their limitations are
surveyed.
16 See, for example, G.D. Watson et aL, Civil Litigation: Cases and Materials, 4th ed. (Toronto:
Emond Montgomery, 1991) at c. 4.
17 CasActimn R.S.Q. c. R-2.1; part of Art. 710 C.C.P.
18 See Bill 28,An Act respecting Class Proceedings, 2d Sess., 35th Leg., Ontario, 1992 (assented
to 25 June 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6); and Bill 29,An Act to amend the Law Society Act to Provide for
Funding to Parties to Class Proceedings, 2d sess., 35th Leg., Ontario, 1992 (assented to 25 June 1992,
S.O. 1992, c. 7). Both came into force on 1 January 1993.
19 Court Challenges Program, Information Sheet: Funding for Equality Cases (Ottawa:'Court
Challenges Program, 2 November 1990). Ottawa also funds a programme for test cases involving
important Aboriginal legal issues. See Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Indian Test Case
Funding: Tenms and Conditions, Contribution Program (Ottawa: INAC 1990).
20 Court Challenges Program, ibid. at 3.
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II. REVIEW OF FUNDING MECHANISMS
A. Introduction
There is a wide assortment of mechanisms that have been and
are being used to provide funding to citizens and public interest
participants in administrative proceedings. For discussion purposes,
these mechanisms are grouped into a number of "models." There are
two main characteristics differentiating these models. First, a distinction
is made between the sources of funding: "public" or "proponent."
"Public" means that the source is general government or other public
sector funds. By contrast, "proponent" funding refers to a specific
source which may be either governmental (such as a municipality,
provincial ministry, or Crown corporation) or non-governmental. A
"proponent" is an actor subject to a regulatory process, and as part of its
application for authorization in that process, it becomes the source for
funding. The underlying rationale for requiring proponent funding is
that, because the proponent benefits, financially and otherwise from
such authorization, it should underwrite the expenses of those who, by
their participation, will assist the regulating authority to come to a better
decision "in the public interest." An obvious limit to this model is that
there must be an identifiable proponent in the process who can be
ordered, and who is financially able, to provide such funds.
The second characteristic used to differentiate these models is
the distinction between intervenor funding and costs awards. Though
the distinction is not airtight (for example, intervenor funding awards
and interim costs can become very close in theory and in practice), the
focus of the former is on an award at the beginning of the proceedings
centred on financial need. The latter is usually awarded at the end, and
hinges both on whether the participant has made an effective
contribution to the proceedings and whether the participant is financially
needy. It will be seen that the criterion of need is a factor that looms
large in our analysis of any preferred model.
Using these characteristics, the following models are discussed
and analyzed in terms of their potential to make access more effective:
1. Public Funding of Intervenors
a) Direct Funding
i) Ad hoc Intervenor Funding
ii) Regularized Intervenor Funding





2. Direct Funding of Intervenors by Proponents
a) Costs, Compensation, and Fee Shifting
b) Intervenor Funding
The following discussion is rather detailed in some places. We
have leaned toward the inclusion of such particulars because of the
relative inaccessibility of some of the models. The irony of the difficulty
in discovering the existence of these programmes designed to facilitate
access, let alone assessing their impact, is by no means lost on us.
Finally, while at a theoretical and policy level our sympathies are
clearly in favour of funding mechanisms, we make a general plea for a
systematic study of them so that their actual workings (including,
obviously, their weaknesses) can be gauged. It is not enough to say that
funding should result in effective participation without later measuring
that effectiveness in some way. These measures have not been
undertaken with respect to most mechanisms. An important exception
to this lack of systematic review is the evaluation of the Ontario
Intervenor Funding Project Act, 1988,21 which we undertook in 1992, and
the highlights of which we discuss below in Section 2 (b).
1. Public Funding of Intervenors
a) Direct Funding
Sharing funds with public interest intervenors in administrative
proceedings began in Canada with the awarding of "costs" by boards
regulating gas and electricity rates. The first board to award costs to
citizen intervenors was the Alberta Public Utilities Board, commencing
in 1960. (Because costs are payable by the regulated industry and passed
along to customers through rates, they are addressed under the second
model, proponent funding). A different route has been followed with
the provision of funds by governments and other public bodies. Starting
with the Berger Commission in 1974, most of this funding has occurred
through programmes established for one-time inquiries where the
criteria and funds vary from case to case. Direct funding by government
21 S.O. 1988, c. 71 (now R.S.O. 1990, c. 1.13) [hereinafter IFPA].
1993] 695
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
is also the model that has been used (but largely abandoned) in the
United States, although this was done through a regularized process. In
both situations, the funding has not been accompanied by the power to
award costs at the end of a proceeding payable by the proponent.
i) Ad Hoc Intervenor Funding
The Berger Commission was the first and most influential
funding experiment in Canada. More formally known as the Mackenzie
Valley Pipeline Inquiry, the Commission was established in 1974 to
review the social, cultural, and environmental impacts in northern
Canada of the proposals to build pipelines to bring natural gas to
southern Canada. Berger determined that funding would be necessary
to ensure that the many diverse interests affected by the proposals would
be represented at the hearings. Berger creatively interpreted the
provisions of his terms of reference to authorize funding for public
interest intervenors, and was able to secure funds from the federal
government for this purpose. Approximately $1.7 million, out of the
total cost for the inquiry of $4.8 million, was awarded to Aboriginal
organizations, an environmental group, northern municipalities, and
northern businesses.
The Commission established the following criteria for funding
eligibility: that applicants have a clearly ascertainable interest that
should be represented; that separate and adequate representation of
that interest would make a necessary and substantial contribution; that
applicants have an established record of concern for and a demonstrated
commitment to the interest; that applicants do not have sufficient
resources to adequately represent the interest; and that applicants have
a clear proposal for the use of funds and be sufficiently well organized to
account for them.22 These criteria have served as the basis for virtually
all subsequent funding programmes.
Most commentators on the funding aspect of the Inquiry,
including Berger himself, claim it had a significant impact on the
outcome of the Inquiry:
The usefulness of the funding that was provided has been amply demonstrated. All
concerned showed an awareness of the magnitude of the task. The funds supplied to the
intervenors, although substantial, should be considered in the light of the estimated cost
2 2 Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland. The Report of the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry,
vol. 2 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1977) (Commissioner: T.R. Berger) at 225-26.
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of the project itself, and of the funds expended by the pipeline companies in assembling
their own evidence.
Criticisms of the funding programme focused on the inadequacy of the
amount of funding, particularly for the funded environmental group
which nearly went bankrupt, and on the view that funding did not bring
major new interests into the debate.24
Following the Berger Commission, several Canadian
governments adopted that model on an ad hoc basis for numerous
commissions and inquiries as a way of increasing public interest group
participation. Examples include the federal Lysyk Inquiry (Alaska
Highway Pipeline); the seven-year Ontario Royal Commission on the
Northern Environment; the five-year Porter Commission on Electric
Power Planning (Ontario); the 1977 Thompson Inquiry into West Coast
Oil Ports; the Ontario PCB Inquiry;, several panels established under the
federal Environmental Assessment and Review Process; the
Saskatchewan Cluff Lake Inquiry; and environmental and energy
hearings in Ontario prior to passage of the IFPA.
One example of how this model has been applied in a regulatory
setting is the federal Alachlor Review Board 5 In 1985, the federal
Minister of Agriculture cancelled the registration of the pesticide
alachlor under the Pest Control Products Act.26  Monsanto, a
manufacturer of alachlor, required a review of this decision and a
Review Board was formed. Since this case was very important regarding
certain aspects of pesticide regulation, the Minister of Agriculture
ordered the review board to provide money to intervenors in need of
funds to participate.
The criteria for eligibility were determined by the Review Board
and were based on the Berger criteria. Members of the Pest
Management Advisory Board acted as an Intervenor Funding
Committee in order to attain a degree of independence from the Board
and the Minister. The original ceiling on available funds was $75,000 but
$127,500 was eventually provided. These funds were used for legal and
expert witness fees, travel, and administrative overhead. According to
23Tbid at 226.
24 See discussion in R.J.D. Page, Northern Development: The Canadian Dilemma (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart, 1986); and Frangois Bregha, "A Ten Year Muddle: The Northern Pipeline
and Canadian Energy Policy" (1979-80) 59:695 Canadian Forum 16-21.
25 See discussion in H. Versteeg, "Intervenor Funding: The Alachlor Review Board
Experience" (1990) 3 CJ.A.P. 91.
2 6 R.S.C. 1985, c. P-9.
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one member of the funding committee, there was "absolutely no doubt
that intervenor funding was critical" to effective participation by the
public interest intervenors 27 Some criticisms of this particular process
were that there were no guidelines for applicants and that a 50 per cent
holdback was imposed which created problems for intervenors. Court
action was initiated at several points in the review but no funds were
available for the intervenors for that purpose.
A major criticism of the ad hoc process is that it is ad hoc. This
means there is no certainty for intervenors as to whether there will be
funding; the criteria may change for each hearing; the amounts may be
limited and, therefore, not sufficient for effective participation; the
timing of funding may not always be appropriate; and even when similar
criteria are used, there have been inconsistent funding decisions. 28 On
the other hand, unlike a costs model, ad hoc funding on the Berger
model is provided at the front end of a hearing, providing some certainty
to participating groups. In addition, the model is tied to the criterion of
"need." Only those groups who would not otherwise be able to
participate are funded. This requirement provides a clear link to the
goal of making access more effective.
ii) Regularized Intervenor Funding
The longest standing regularized government funding
programmes for intervenors were those that operated in U.S. federal
regulatory agencies primarily in the 1970s. However, one Canadian
agency, the Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office (FEARo),
has recently switched from ad hoc funding to a regularized process.
Meanwhile, in Saskatchewan, the Environmental Assessment Review
Commission has called for the revival of "stakeholder funding."
Saskatchewan had Canada's first statutory intervenor funding provisions
(in The Environmental Assessment Act) but these were removed from
2 7 Versteeg, supra note 25 at 97.
2 8 See discussion with respect to the Orders in Council providing intervenor funding prior to
passage of IFPA in H. Campbell, Intervenor Funding and the Intervenor Funding Project Act in
Ontario: A Report Prepared by the Canadian Environmental Defence Fund for the Ministry of the
Environment (Toronto: Canadian cEDF, 1991) at 22-23.
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that Act in 1988 9 The Commission's proposal for a new regularized
funding process has yet to be acted on.30
The FE.RO administers the federal environmental assessment
programme. Until recently, funding for intervenors in public reviews
had been supplied on an ad hoc basis by departments involved in the
review.31 However, as part of the development of the new Canadian
Environmental Assessment Act,32 a more regularized process has been
instituted. The programme is not referred to in the Act, but it is an
administrative programme administered by FEARO. The programme,
initiated in 1991, has been allocated $8.5 million for distribution to
intervenors over a six-year period.
Funds will be made available to cover the costs of preparation
for, and participation in, the environmental assessment process. The
funds will not be limited to the hearing stage of the process but will also
be available for "phase I" activities, which include participation in the
development of the guidelines document that forms the basis of the
environmental impact statement. Funding will be available to those who
meet certain criteria. To be eligible, an intervenor must have a
"demonstrated interest in the potential environmental effects of the
proposal under review and the social effects directly related to those
environmental effects," a need for financial assistance, and must have
made an attempt to coordinate with others "sharing like interests."33
Priority will go to those whose "way of life or means of making a living
will be directly affected by the project."34
Eligible costs will be those that are relevant to the panel's terms
of reference and do not duplicate existing services or studies, including
professional fees, research costs, travel expenses, purchase of
documents, information collection and dissemination, office expenses,
etc.35 FEARO actively discourages legal representation at panel reviews,
29 S.S. 1979-80, c. E-10.1, s.6, as am. by The Governmental Organization Consequential
AmendmentAct, 1988, S.S. 1988-89, c. 42, s. 37(3).
30 See Environmental Challenges: The Report of the Saskatchewan Environmental Assessment
Review Commission (Regina: Saskatchewan Environment and Public Safety, 1991) at 49-52
[hereinafter Environmental Challenges]; and telephone interview with M.A. Bowden, Chair of the
Commission (6 February 1992).
31 Telephone interview with Ghislaine Kerry, IEAno (6 February 1992).
32 S.C. 1992, c. 37 (not yet in force).
33 Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office, Participant Funding Program (Ottawa:





so it will be interesting to see to what extent legal fees will be applied for
and fundedV6 The funding application will be made to an independent
funding administration committee that will make recommendations to
the executive chair of FEARO, who will make the final decision. There is
no appeal and costs awards cannot be made at the end of the review
process.
A regularized process of public funding overcomes some of the
disadvantages of the ad hoc processes. Most importantly, potential
intervenors can plan their intervention with a clearer expectation of
assistance. This predictability will increase as the fixed criteria are
interpreted, resulting in, it is hoped, consistent application. The FEARO
mechanism is particularly useful for public interest intervenors because
of its emphasis on need, and its application to the pre-hearing stages of
the process where well-informed participation is often essential, but is
not usually funded. It will remain to be seen, however, whether the
amounts awarded will be sufficient to allow for effective participation.
b) Indirect Public Funding
Governments provide assistance to intervenors in order to aid
indirect participation through a number of mechanisms. Two that will
be discussed below are legal aid and a public advocate. In addition,
some avenues for providing partial assistance are worth mentioning.
One has been the provision of funds by Canadian federal departments to
some public interest groups which allow them to either carry on their
daily activities, or to take part in proceedings of special interest. For
example, the Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs provides
sustaining funding to the Public Interest Advocacy Centre and the
Consumers' Association of Canada, and has also provided funds to the
Consumers' Association and the National Anti-Poverty Organization to
intervene in the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications
Commission (cRTc) proceedings.&3 7 The Department of Indian Affairs
and Northern Development provided funds to the Inuit Tapirisat of
Canada to participate in a National Energy Board hearing; and
36 The panel review is required to be informal and non-judicial, but structured. See
Environmental Assessment and Review Process Guidelines Order SOR/84-467, s. 27(1).
37 j. Keeping, "Intervenors' Costs" (1990) 3 C.J.AL.P. 81 at 84.
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Environment Canada provides limited sustaining funds to environmental
groups.38
Some boards make technical assistance available to intervenors
as another way of providing partial assistance. At the Ontario
Environmental Assessment Board, for example, the board can hire
experts to assist it.39 The board has retained experts to address issues in
a hearing and to assist intervenors both on its own initiative and when
intervenors could not afford to hire an expert. 4o
i) Legal Aid
In Ontario, persons without sufficient financial resources can
hire a lawyer who will be paid by the provincial Legal Aid Plan. If the
lawyer is in private practice, an application must be made to the Plan
and, if the person is eligible, a certificate will be issued. In addition,
community and specialty clinics have lawyers and community legal
workers on staff to provide legal services to those who qualify. Specialty
clinics relevant to a discussion of public interest participation include the
Canadian Environmental Law Association, the Toronto Workers'
Health and Safety Clinic, the Advocacy Resource Centre for the
Handicapped, and the Advocacy Centre for the Elderly.
In Ontario and other provinces, legal aid certificates have been
used by groups in proceedings which address public interest issues. For
example, in a Joint Board hearing addressing the site selection for the
new Halton Region landfill, Ontario Legal Aid funded half of the legal
fees for one citizens' group. The other group of citizens participating
was represented by a legal aid clinic, the Canadian Environmental Law
Association. Certificates have also been issued to groups participating in
the Environmental Assessment Board, Environmental Appeal Board,
and Ontario Municipal Board hearings. 41 These certificates have been
important in allowing groups which fall outside the application of the
38 Both cited by IA. Blue, "Costs and Intervenor Funding-The National Energy Board" in N.
Bankes & J.0. Saunders, eds., Public Disposition of Natural Resources: Essays from the First Banff
Conference on Natural Resources Law (Calgary. Canadian Institute of Resources Law, 1984) 235 at
239.
39 EnvironmentalAssessmentAc4 R.S.O. 1990, c. E.18, s. 18(10).
40 See R.B. Eisen, "Expert Opinion Evidence at Environmental Board Hearings" (1989) 3
CE.L.R. (N.S.) 63.
4 1 Ontario Legal Aid Plan, Report Regarding Environmental Cases to the LegalAid Committee
by the Group Applications and Test Cases Subcommittee, (Toronto: Ontario Legal Aid Plan,
September 1991).
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IFPA to participate in hearings or to supplement such funding.
However, despite the important role legal aid can and has played in
increasing access, the Ontario Legal Aid Plan subcommittee which
considers group applications recently recommended that group
certificates no longer be issued in environmental cases, largely due to the
disproportionately high cost of such cases compared to others coming
before the subcommittee.' 2 The subcommittee recommended that a
more appropriate funding mechanism for environmental cases would be
to expand the IFPA to include cases before the Environmental Appeal
Board.43 However, this would leave a gap in court actions involving
environmental issues for which legal aid may still be the only funding
mechanism available.
Legal aid has the advantage of allowing clients to choose and
instruct their own lawyers. Eligibility is tied to financial need, so there is
a link to the goal of access. However, as the Ontario decision on funding
environmental cases demonstrates, there are many interests competing
for scarce public funds. Where there are complex administrative
proceedings which require sustained participation over many weeks or
months, it is unrealistic to look to legal aid to fund that participation.
ii) Public Advocate
A different model for providing assistance to public intervenors
is the establishment of an office of a public (or consumer) advocate.
The public advocate would carry out research and investigations,
disseminate information, and intervene in administrative proceedings as
the representative of the general public interest or a special segment of
it (such as consumers or mental health patients, etc.). This model has
had more of a history in the United States than in Canada. While public
advocacy has been experienced at the U.S. state level, no consumer
advocacy office has been established federally, despite many prolonged
attempts.
New Jersey, with twenty years of experience, provides a useful
example. The Department of the Public Advocate was established there
in 1974 as a vehicle for advancing the concerns and interests of classes of
4 2 In contrast to Ontario, in Manitoba, legal aid to groups is expressly available only where the
objective of the applicant group relates "to an issue of public interest including ... any consumer or
environmental issue." See The LegalAid Services Sociely ofManitobaAc, R.S.M. 1987, c. L105, s.
4(2)(b).
43 Ontario Legal Aid Plan, supra note 41 at footnote 58.
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citizens who were traditionally unrepresented or underrepresented in
administrative decision making.44 The Department consists of a number
of specialized divisions, including the divisions of Public Interest
Advocacy, Mental Health Advocacy, Rate Counsel, Advocacy for the
Developmentally Disabled, and Citizen Complaints.' 5 Staff from each
division act as public representatives. They initiate investigations or
proceedings, intervene in a wide range of administrative proceedings,
and attempt to resolve issues without resorting to litigation. The
Department boasts an impressive resume of accomplishments in
advancing the interests of the public in such areas as affordable housing,
tenant rights, environmental protection, utility rates, patients' rights, and
health care.'
Another example of a public advocate at the state level is the
Wisconsin Public Intervenor, who operates as part of the Department of
Justice.47 The Public Intervenor is given the right to intervene in certain
proceedings in order to protect public rights in water and other natural
resources, and may initiate investigations or other proceedings. 48
Wisconsin and other states also have an advocacy mechanism
known as "citizen utility boards" to "represent and protect the interests
of the residential utility consumers." The boards are created by statute
but members and funds are drawn from the citizens of the state.49 The
board educates consumers on energy conservation, transmits
information about energy issues to its members, and intervenes in utility
proceedings.
This model is not well-developed in Canada. Two examples of
its use are at the Ontario Energy Board (oEB) and the Manitoba Legal
Aid Services Society's Public Interest Law Centre.
The oF maintains a large technical staff which plays an
important role in advancing the "public interest" through board
44 New Jersey, Department of the Public Advocate, Evolution of the Department of the Public
Advocate (Trenton, NJ.: NJ. Dept. of the Public Advocate, 15 July 1990) at 2.
45 New Jersey, Department of the Public Advocate and Office of the Public Defender, 1990
AnnualReport (Trenton, NJ.: NJ. Dept. of the Public Advocate, 1990).
46 New Jersey, Department of the Public Advocate, Department of the Public Advocate
Accomplishments Checklist (Trenton, N.J.: NJ. Dept. of the Public Advocate, 1991).
47 See Department offusticeAc4 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 165.07 (West Supp. 1988).
48 Ibid. The Public Intervenor is automatically given notice of all proceedings under the
state's environmental and natural resources statutes.
49 See Wis. Stat. Ann. ch. 199 (West Supp. 1988); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 111 2/3, para. 901; Or.
Rev. Stat. §§ 774.010-774.990 (1989). Generally, there is a statutory limit on the amount of funds
that any one person can contribute to the Board.
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hearings. The oEB staff acts as a separate intervenor. Technical staff
members and special counsel review applications, sometimes hire
outside experts, present evidence, and cross-examine other parties in
their role as watchdogs. These staff members are distinct from those
who advise the Board in their deliberations. Members of the public with
an interest in a hearing are able to consult with the OEB technical staff,
special counsel, and outside experts. A continuing issue is the
appropriate role of Board staff with respect to intervenors funded under
the IFPA who are also raising "public interest" positions. 50
The Manitoba Public Interest Law Centre operates essentially as
a specialized clinic representing groups who seek to raise "public
interest" issues or bring a test case. In addition, the Centre undertakes
law reform activities. Clients must qualify for legal aid and cases must
raise an issue of public interest primarily affecting lower income
Manitobans. Groups will often be required to contribute toward the
costs, but individuals usually cannot. Although the Centre does not
generally undertake environmental cases, it does intervene in public
utility rate cases before the Manitoba Public Utilities Board, which has
ruled that the Centre can recover costs in proceedings before it.51
Although the public advocacy model has been effective in some
states,5 2 one of the major criticisms with this model, especially as it has
operated in the U.S., is that the advocate's office determines and
advances its view of the public interest and does not represent particular
groups, which may have conflicting views on what the "public interest"
is. Thus, for potential intervenors, "their" case may be taken out of their
hands.
2. Direct Funding of Intervenors by Proponents
a) Costs, Compensation, and Fee Shifting
The most common experience for proponents funding
intervenors in Canadian tribunals is the imposition of costs awards.
50 See discussion in Bogart & Valiante, supra note 1 at 267-69.
51 Telephone interview with Arne Peltz, Director, Public Interest Law Centre (10 February
1992); and The Legal Aid Services Society of Manitoba, Report of the Public Interest Law Centre,
1990-91 (Manitoba: Public Interest Law Centre, 1991).
52 K. Engelhart & M. Trebilcock, Participation in the Regulatory Process: The Issue of Funding
(Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1981) at 134 [Regulation Reference, Working Paper No.
17].
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Some Canadian tribunals in their enabling statutes are given the power
to award "costs." Most of the cost provisions are identical from board to
board and between jurisdictions:
(1) 'The costs of and incidental to any proceeding before the Board axe in the discretion
of the Board, and may be fixed in any case at a sum certain or may be taxed. (2) The
Board may order by whom and to whom any costs are to be paid, and by whom the same
are to be taxed and allowed. (3) The Board may prescribe a scale under which such costs
are to be taxed.53
These provisions are similar to those in court proceedings from which
the statutory language was drawn.5
4
For many years, most boards with a power over costs did not
exercise it in favour of intervenors s5 The Alberta Public Utilities Board
was the first to do so in 1960. Since then, other boards have begun to
award intervenors' costs, including the CRTC, the Alberta Energy
Resources Conservation Board, the orE, and the Manitoba Public
Utilities Board. However, in two cases, boards have backed away from
awarding costs because of the increasing expense placed on utility
customers. These boards are the Alberta Public Utilities Board and the
British Columbia Utilities Commission.56
53 Examples of boards with the power to award costs: Ontario Energy Board, Ontario
Municipal Board, Ontario Joint Boards under the Consolidated Hearings Act, cRic; Public Utilities
Boards in Alberta, Manitoba, Newfoundland, Quebec, and Nova Scotia; Alberta Energy Resources
Conservation Board. Others are mentioned in Blue, supra note 38 at 235-48; and in A.J. Roman,
EffectiveAdvocacy BeforeAdministrative Tribunals (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) at 325.
54 The Ontario Divisional Court makes this point in Re Regional Municipality of Hamilton-
Wentworth and Hamilton-Wentworth Save The Valley Committee, Inc. (1985), 51 O.R. (2d) 23 at 30
[hereinafter Hamilton- Wentworth].
55 Some boards have never exercised their costs power for any purpose (the Canadian
Transport Commission, for example, discussed below). Others use their power as a punitive
measure, awarding costs against parties whose case is frivolous or vexatious (the Ontario Municipal
Board, for example).
5 6 Since 1975, the Alberta Public Utiltities Board (PUB) has shown less willingness to award
costs, largely because costs have been "escalating dramatically" in recent years. Because these costs
are passed on to utility customers, the Board "sees itself as having an obligation to the public to
ensure that these costs are fair and reasonable." When the PuB changed its guidelines to limit the
types of costs that could be compensated, that decision was challenged by intervenors, but upheld
(Re Green, Michaels &Associates Ltd. and Public Utilities Board (1979), 94 D.L.R. (3d) 641 (Alta.
S.C.A.D.) [hereinafter Re Green]). In 1989, the Board reviewed its costs practices and adopted a
schedule of fees and disbursements that cap the amounts that will be awarded by the Board. See
Alberta Public Utilities Board, Procedural Review Report (Edmonton: Alberta puB, 30 June 1989) at
20-31, App. 2.
In British Columbia, the Utilities Commission awarded intervenors' costs until its enabling
statute, the Utilities Commission Act, S.B.C. 1980, c. 60, s. 133, was amended in 1984 by the
Miscellaneous Statutes Amendment Act (No. 1), 1984, S.B.C. 1984, c. 25, s. 67, to prohibit the
practice. This amendment was the result of cost-cutting measures by the B.C. government following
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Each board has its own guidelines for awarding costs but all of
them use the criterion of "contribution," that is, whether the intervenor
assisted the board in understanding the issues and reaching its
decision s7 The OEB recently revised its cost policies so that intervenors
can now expect to be awarded 100 per cent of their reasonably incurred
costs, "unless the intervention is seen to have not been pertinent or
responsible."58 This focus on contribution means that costs are used as a
method of regulating the quality of interventions. The threat of no costs,
or an award of costs against a party, screens out frivolous interventions.
It also keeps intervenors closely focused on those issues that a tribunal
considers to be relevant.
Only the Manitoba Public Utilities Board and the CRTC consider
financial need to be an important criterion for awarding costs at the end
of a hearing 9  Thus, in most circumstances, well-funded intervenors
with a commercial interest in the outcome of a hearing are eligible for
costs. The absence of need as a criterion reinforces the traditional view
that costs should not be used to encourage participation in order to
make the right of access more effective.6°
Courts have generally been unwilling to interfere with a
tribunal's discretion in awarding costs. 61 However, where a board fetters
one hearing in which $357,000 had been awarded to intervenors, most going to environmental and
Aboriginal groups. See discussion of this case in R.W. Shorthouse, "The Demise of Public
Funding" (1985) 43 The Advocate 601; andAlkali Lake Indian Band v. Westcoast Transmission Co.,
[1984] 4 W.W.R. 263 (B.C.CA.) [hereinafterAlkali Lake].
5 7 See, for example, Re Green, ibid. at 653-54:
The Board is prepared to pass on to the public those costs of intervention which it has
found to be of some value to the public interest. There is no error in law in this:
rather, it is generally recognized as proper. ... It is not in the public interest to have
intervention merely for the sake of intervention: there should be some perceptible
value to it, and the Board has left open for consideration in any given case whether the
services of the consultant were in some way or to some extent of value, and not merely
misconceived or frivolous.
See also Consumers'Association of Canada (Alberta) and Edmonton v. Public Utilities Board
(1985), 58 A.R. 72 at 77.
58 Memorandum of Ontario Energy Board to All Intervenors in Recent Proceedings (24
February 1992) at 2. The Board states that cost awards will be reduced "when intervention is
judged to have been notably deficient." For example, where intervention has not been relevant,
where it has been duplicative concerning evidence, where cross-examination has been excessive, or
where there has been misconduct.
59 According to Keeping, supra note 37 at 89, the OEB expressly rejected the requirement of
financial need, but she maintains it is a factor that will be taken into account.
60 he only exception to this is with respect to interim costs, discussed below.
61 See Re Municipal and Public Utility Board, [1930] 1 W.W.R. 615 (Man. CA.); Bell Canada v.
Consumers'Association of Canada (1986), 17 Admin. L.R. 205 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Bell Canada];
Re Green, supra note 56; and Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro v. Newfoundland and Labrador
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its discretion by denying costs on the basis of a letter from a Minister,62
or wrongly interprets the meaning of "costs" to include interim costs,63
the courts have intervened.
The more restrictive reading of these provisions has been that
costs have the same meaning as court costs: they follow the event and
are an indemnity for actual costs expended. They are not to be used to
encourage participation generally.5 4 Despite its widespread acceptance,
this view is based on the questionable notion that courts and tribunals,
and the parties appearing before them, are engaged in comparable tasks.
Some courts and most commentators have pointed out the distinct
differences in the roles of courts and tribunals:
There is no underlying similarity between the two procedures, or their purposes, to
enable the principles underlying costs in litigation between parties to be necessarily
applied to public hearings on public concerns. In the latter case the whole of the
circumstances are to be taken into account, not merely the position of the litigant who
has incurred expense in the vindication of a right.
65
The Economic Council of Canada recommended that costs be
used as one mechanism for funding public interest groups. It specifically
recommended that "all statutory regulatory agencies formulate rules for
awarding costs to public interest group interveners and, where legislation
does not allow such awards, that appropriate amendments be made."66
The availability of costs at the end of a hearing provides an
incentive for public interest intervenors to participate. But because of
uncertainty regarding whether an award will be made and delay in
recovering the award, it clearly falls short of the incentive associated
with funding up front. There are a few Canadian boards with the power
to make advance orders for costs which, in theory, could provide an
Federation of Munilcipalities (1979), 24 Nfld. & P.E.LR. 317 (Nfld. CA.).
62 See Ailali Lake, supra note 56. In the Alkali Lake case, the Court overturned a ruling of
the B.C. Utilities Commission which refused costs to the intervening Band. This ruling was based on
a letter from the Minister of Energy stating that cost awards should be discontinued in accordance
with the government's policies of "economy and restraint." The Court held that the Commission
had fettered its discretion and that there was no clear reason to refuse costs. The Court ordered
that the Band's costs be paid. However, the Legislature amended the Utilities Commission Ac;
supra note 56 to remove the costs power just prior to the release of the Court's decision.
63 The cases involving an advance of costs are Hamilton-Wentworth, supra note 54; Re Ontario
Energy Board (1985), 51 O.1. (2d) 333 (Div. Ct.); and Manitoba Society of Seniors Inc. v. Greater
Wmn4eg Gas Co. (1982), 18 Man. R. (2d) 440 (CA.).
64 See especially Hamilton-Wentwortlk supra note 54.
65 Re Green, supra note 56 at 655-56. See also, Macaulay, supra note 14 at c. 27; and L. Fox,
Annotation (1986), 17 Admin. L.I 206 (in Bell Canada, supra note 61).
66 Economic Council of Canada, Reforming Regulation (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and
Services Canada, 1981) at 135.
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incentive. The Alberta Energy Resources Conservation Board (ERCB)
and the CRTc are two examples.
The Alberta ERCB is a tribunal with broad authority to supervise
the energy industry in Alberta, including the ability to approve new
developments. Since 1978, the ERCB has reimbursed "local intervenors"
for their Board interventions. 67 Local intervenors (defined as those
with an interest in land which may be affected by a decision) 68 are
usually awarded costs at the end of the hearing, payable by the
proponent. However, the Energy Resources Conservation Act provides
that the Board may "make an advance of costs to a local intervener and
it may direct any terms and conditions for the payment or repayment of
the advance by any party to the proceeding that the Board considers
appropriate." 69 Criteria that the Board considers when making an
advance of costs are: whether the person applying comes within the
definition of a local intervenor; whether the advance is "necessary prior
to the holding of the hearing"; and whether the intervenor has
"established a need at that time for financial assistance in the
preparation and presentation" of the intervention. 70
An advance of costs is paid by the Board to the intervenor but,
because it remains contingent until the final costs award, the costs are
usually ultimately paid by the proponent. The costs of such an award are
those that are reasonable and directly and necessarily related to the
hearing. The Board decides what costs are reasonable and necessary in
light of the circumstances of each case. It also stresses the need to be
"economical" in the sense of needing to avoid duplication. 71 There are
no express limits on what disbursements are eligible for repayment. The
ERcB costs awards appear relatively modest. The amounts have ranged
from $100 for an unrepresented individual to $50,000 for a group
represented by counsel. 72
The ERCB has amended its costs regulations and guidelines twice
in the past, but there has been no comprehensive audit of the
programme. The programme is now under review with the expectation
6 7 Alberta, Energy Resources Conservation Board, GuidelinesRespectingApplicationforLocal
Intervenors' CostsAwards (Calgary: Eaca, 1988) at 1 [hereinafter Guidelines].
68 Energy Resources Conservation Ac4 .S.A 1980, c. E-11, s. 31(1).
69 Ibi. at s. 31(6), as am. by SA. 1981, c. 47, s. 2.
70 Alta. Reg. 517/82, s. 12(2).
71 Guidelines, supra note 67 at appendix A.
72 bU at 5. $50,000 is considered an "exceptional" amount by ERCB standards.
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of some further "fine tuning" rather than major changes. 73 It is possible
that the Alberta Legislature will change the eligibility criteria for
receiving costs to parallel those of the newly created Natural Resources
Conservation Board. 74 There an intervenor need only show a "potential
direct effect" rather than an interest in the land affected. 5 This would
greatly broaden the number of eligible intervenors to include those who
wish to represent a larger public interest.
The costs programme of the ERCB has been criticized primarily
because of its very restrictive reading of the definition of "local
intervenor." The present definition was adopted in 1981 to broaden the
number of groups that would be eligible for funds, but the narrow view
the Board has adopted
not only contradicts the clear legislative intent to broaden the grounds of qualification for
intervener costs, but also subverts the very purpose and intent of the public-hearing
process. It is forcing on the concerned public an unnecessary connection to a proprietary
interest to front a more genuine environmental concern regarding the disposition of
resources.7 6
Because of the strict limits on eligibility, funding at the ERCB
does not operate to help a broad range of public interest intervenors
gain access to the decision-making process.
The CRTC is the only Canadian federal tribunal which awards
costs to intervenors in its proceedings. Its authority is found in s. 76 of
the National Telecommunications Powers and Procedures Act,77 which
contains the standard Canadian costs clause. The Canadian Transport
73 Letter from J.K. Moloney, Legal Department, ERCB to W.A. Bogart and Marcia Valiante
(17 December 1991).
74 Moloney, ibid.; Natural Resources Conservation BoardAct S.A. 1990, c. N-5.5, s. 10. Under
this new Act, funding is available for intervenors who "are or may be directly affected by a
reviewable project" (s. 10(1)).
75 The Board's view of who will be directly affected includes those who live or work near the
project; those who regularly use the air, water, land, or wildlife affected by the project; and those
with direct financial effects. See Natural Resources Conservation Board, Guidelines Respecting
Clamsfor Ehgible Interveners Costs Awards (Calgary: NRcB 31 July 1991) at 2-3. In the Board's first
award of costs, four environmental groups seeking funds were denied costs "largely because they
couldn't prove strong membership in the Canmore region" and thus were not directly affected. M.
Lamb, "Resort Study Money Limited" Calgaiy Herald (25 March 1992) B2.
76 L.F. Duncan, "Equal Pay For Work of Equal Value: A Public Interest Perspective on
Intervener Costs" in Bankes & Saunders, eds, supra note 38,249 at 252.
7 7 R.S.C. 1985, c. N-20 (now known as the National Transportation Act).
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Commission (crc) also derives authority from the predecessor to this
statute but has consistently refused to award costs to intervenors. 78
The CRTC applies the Telecommunications Rules of Procedure
when awarding costs. These regulations detail the procedure and
eligibility criteria for an award. To receive costs, an intervenor must
have:
(a) ... an interest in the outcome of the proceeding of such a nature that the intervener or
group or class of subscribers will receive a benefit or suffer a detriment as a result of the
order or decision resulting from the proceeding, (b) ... participated in a responsible war,
and (c) ... contributed to a better understanding of the issues by the Commission. 79
According to one review of the CRTc, the Commission's primary focus in
determining eligibility, in practice, is on the contribution the intervenor
makes, not on the degree to which the intervenor is representative of an
interest 8 0 However, the CRTC also requires that an intervenor lack
sufficient funds to enable it to participate. Thus, although need is not an
express criterion in s. 44 of the Rules, since 1978 the Commission has
consistently "exercised its [costs] discretion in favour of public interest
groups that would otherwise lack sufficient funds to intervene, in order
to meet the objective of obtaining informed participation in public
hearings."81 The CRTC will, therefore, not award costs to commercial
enterprises.
The CRTC has established a regime of interim costs awards for
"intervenors who lack sufficient funds to participate in a commission
proceeding."8 2 The jurisdiction to make interim costs awards comes
from s. 76 combined with s. 60(2) which authorizes the making of interim
orders.8 3 The Commission considered its jurisdiction to award interim
costs to be in doubt following the Federal Court of Appeal decision in
Bell Canada v. Canadian Radio-Television Telecommunications
78 1bid. The crc has refused to award costs since 1911. This policy was reviewed in a hearing
held in 1975 but the recommendation was for the crc not to depart from its past practice. This is
reviewed in T.G. Kane, Consumers and the Regulators: Intervention in the Federal Regulatory Process
(Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1980) at 106-07; Engelhart & Trebilcock, supra
note 52; and MJ. Trebilcock, "Regulators and the Consumer Interest: The Canadian Transport
Commission's Costs Decision" (1977-78) 2 Can. Bus. L.J. 101.
79 SOR/79-554, s. 44(1).
80 Engelhart & Trebilcock, supra note 52 at 85.
81 Re Mantijne Tel & Tel Ltd., Novix et al; Re Application to Review and Vary Telecom Costs
Order cm'c 91-3, Telecom Letter Decision 91-6 (26 July 1991) at 4.
82 Letter from K Spicer, Chair, carc to W.A. Bogart and Marcia Valiante (6 February 1992).
83 National Transportation Ac supra note 77.
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Commission.4 The case dealt with the CRTC's powers to make interim
orders generally. Based on that decision, the CRTc refused to award
interim costs in a 1987 case and no further applications for interim costs
were made until 1991. In 1991, the Commission resumed making
interim costs awards85
The Regulations allow the awarding of interim costs to
intervenors who meet the three criteria above and who "can satisfy the
Commission that [they] do not have sufficient financial resources
available to participate effectively in the proceeding" without an interim
award.8 6 As an interim award, these costs are accounted for in the final
costs award and are therefore potentially repayable. Any intervenor
awarded interim costs is required to apply for costs at the end of the
proceeding and must file documentation that the undertakings were
fulfilled, explaining any difference between the interim award and the
request for final costs.8 7 Costs, whether final or interim, are paid by the
regulated company that is the subject of the hearing. The only limit on
eligible costs is that they should not "exceed those necessarily and
reasonably incurred by the intervenor in connection with its
intervention."88
There has been no comprehensive review of the CRTc's costs
programme, but several commentators have looked at its operations.
According to Engelhart and Trebilcock, in a review a decade ago, the
CRTC improved public access to rate hearings particularly through the
use of its costs power. From their research, they concluded that the
cRTc was generally viewed as even-handed in its treatment of
84 [1988] 1 F.C. 296.
85 In 1991, the Commission received applications for interim costs from two groups-from the
B.C. Old Age Pensioners Organization and other seniors' groups, and from the National Anti.
Poverty Organization and Rural Dignity Canada-in a case involving Unitel Communications.
Following argument, the Commission decided it did have jurisdiction to award interim costs. This
decision is based on the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Bell Canada, supra note 61, which
reversed the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal. In addition, the Commission decided that the
Hamilton-Wentworth case, supra note 54, creates a prohibition on tribunals using their costs powers
to award intervenor funding and not a prohibition on interim costs awards. The difference is that
intervenor funding is based primarily on financial need while interim costs are based primarily on
merit. The Commission went on to award interim costs to the two groups. See In Re: Unitel
Communications Inc. & B.C. Rail Telecommunications/Lightel Inc.-Applications to Provide Public
Long Distance Voice Telephone Services and Related Resale and Sharing Issues: Applications for
Interim Costs, Telecom Costs Order cRTc 91-4 (22 April 1991).
86 SOR/79-554, s. 45(1)(d).
871bi. ss. 45(3), (4).
8 id s. 44(6)(b).
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applications because of its judicial approach and clear procedures. 89
Kane's view, also from the early 1980s, was that the CRTC, through the
use of its costs power, had been successful in increasing public
participation in its proceedings. However, he noted that the process of
applying for costs could be very time consuming:
As positive as this development may be, the awarding of costs to interveners is by no
means a panacea for the financial difficulties confronting consumer groups. In this
respect, for example, the time it has taken consumer groups to actually obtain money
following an award of costs by the CRTC should be noted.90
The Commission recognizes that intervenors would
prefer a true intervenor funding regime, since such a scheme would eliminate the
uncertainty that comes with merit-based awards. From the Commissions' perspective, a
costs award regime requires that the Commission balance its desire to encourage
informed public participation with the legal requirement, gleaned from the jurisprudence
... that costs awards be based on the quality of interventions presented. 91
However, to the extent that "merit," in this context was judged to be
satisfied so long as there was a responsible expenditure of awards, there
might be little difference, in fact, between "interim costs" and
"intervenor funding."
A costs model can provide the funds needed for public interest
intervenors to participate but because its primary focus is on
"contribution" rather than "need," it also funds already well-financed
interests. This obscures the importance of the goal of access. Although
the CRTC programme uses need as a criterion, it is the exception. On the
whole, where a "costs" model is utilized it generally reflects the attitude
that the proponent has some obligation to fund the participation of all
who have contributed to the regulatory process. This may place an
undue burden on the proponent in terms of interests clearly capable of
funding their own participation and who do so for their own financial
interests (as competitors, etc.). At the same time, attention can be
deflected from those seeking to represent broader, more diffuse
interests and who are dependent on the underwriting of their expenses
for effective participation because of a demonstrated lack of resources.
89 Engelhart & Trebilcock, supra note 52 at 84.
90 Kane, supra note 78 at 111.
91 Spicer, supra note 82.
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b) Intervenor Funding
Intervenor funding is an award of funds prior to a proceeding
intended to enable citizens and public interest groups, who would not
otherwise be able to afford it, to participate. In this way it is
distinguished from "costs" which are calculated at the conclusion of a
proceeding and intended to reimburse participants who contributed to
the outcome, usually regardless of need. The only example of a
regularized intervenor funding programme where funding is provided by
proponents is Ontario's Intervenor Funding ProjectAct.92
The Act came into force on 1 April 1989. It was expressly
intended to enable wider and more effective participation by public
interest intervenors in some administrative proceedings. It was not
expected that the Act would equalize the resources of all participants in
a hearing, but it would at least remedy a portion of the disparity. The
1988Act is comprised of two parts. Part I established a three-year pilot
project to provide "intervenor funding" in proceedings before the
Environmental Assessment Board, the OEB, and Joint Boards
considering matters under three environmental statutes. The project
was extended in the spring of 1992 for another four years. These boards
were chosen for the pilot project because they had experience with
funding awards under a series of orders in council.93 Part II of the Act
amended provisions in these boards' statutes relating to the power to
award costs at the end of a proceeding, and was not subject to a three-
year time limit.
92 IFPA, supra note 21. The Act is discussed in Bogart & Valiante, supra note 1; Campbell,
supra note 28; R. Horwood, The Ontario Intervenor Funding ProjectAc 1988: Its Review and Reform
andA Model to Provide for Public Interest Participaon in Regulatory Proceedings in Canada (Ottawa:
Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 1991); L HuininkAn Evaluation of the Funding Denials under the
Intervenor Funding Project Act 1988 (Ryerson, Toronto, 1991) [unpublished]; and S.J. McWilliams,
"The Costs of Intervenor Funding and Their Control: The Experience of the Ontario Energy
Board" (1991) 11 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 217.
93 The IFMA was precipitated by two 1985 Divisional Court judgments which prohibited a
Joint Board and the OEB from using their "costs" power to award advance costs to public interest
intervenors: see Hamilton-Wentworth, supra note 54; and Re Ontario Energy Boar4 supra note 63.
The Court characterized the Joint Board's attempt to award costs in advance as a provision of
"intervenor funding, something which the Board has no jurisdiction to do. It is for the Legislature,
in clear language, to so empower a board or tribunal, should it be found desirable as a matter of
public policy," Hamilton-Wentworth at 43. Following these decisions, the new Liberal government in
Ontario provided funds in selected hearings through orders in council. From 1985 until the JFPA
was proclaimed in 1989, twelve orders in council made public funds available in hearings before the
Environmental Assessment Board, Joint Boards, and the oEn.
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The Act spells out a number of criteria that intervenors must
fulfil to be eligible for funding. First, funding may only be awarded in
relation to certain issues-those that both "affect a significant segment
of the public" and "affect the public interest and not just private
interests." 94 Secondly, there are criteria that relate to the nature of the
intervenor which the panel must consider:
a) the intervenor represents a clearly ascertainable interest that should be represented
at the hearing;,
b) separate and adequate representation of the interest would assist the board and
contribute substantially to the hearing;
c) the intervenor does not have sufficient financial resources to enable it to
adequately represent the interest;
d) the intervenor has made reasonable efforts to raise funding from other sources;
e) the intervenor has an established record of concern for and commitment to the
interest;
f) the intervenor has attempted to bring related interests of which it was aware into an
umbrella group to represent the related interests at the hearing;
g) the intervenor has a clear proposal for its use of any funds which might be awarded;
and
h) the intervenor has appropriate financial controls to ensure that the funds, if
awarded, are spent for the purposes of the award. 95
The Act does not provide for any priority or ranking of these criteria.
Funding panels applying the criteria have, as a general rule, required
that all of the criteria be met to establish eligibility. However, there have
also been circumstances where failure to meet one criterion was not fatal
to an application because it did not interfere with the purpose of the
Act.96 Nevertheless, it is clear that financial need looms very large in
decisions to award such funds. The focus of the IPA, in practice, is very
much on ensuring access for those interests that would otherwise not
have the financial resources to participate at all, or, their participation
would be limited to a substantially diminished role.
There are certain restrictions on the amounts that can be funded.
In particular, legal fees must be assessed at the legal aid rate in effect on
the date of the award97 (though any shortfall may be made up through a
costs award at the end of the hearing); and disbursements are restricted
to those "for consultants, expert witnesses, typing, printing, copying, and
94 IFPA, supra note 21 s. 7(1).
95/bid. s. 7(2).
96 Bogart & Valiante, supra note 1 at 64. The Ontario Court of Justice (General Division)
approved of such an approach in the appeal of the Native Council of Canada v. Environmental
Assessment Board and Ontario Hydro (19 October 1990), Ottawa, Desmarais J. [unreported] from
the Ontario Hydro DemandlSupply Plan hearing.
97 1FPA, supra note 21 s. 7(3).
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transcripts necessary for the representation of the interest." These
eligible disbursements can be expanded by regulation, but to date, this
has not been done.98 The panel is required to set a ceiling on
disbursements and to "deduct from the award funds that are reasonably
available to the applicant from other sources."99
The funding panel can impose conditions on an award and it is a
condition of every award "that the funded intervenor allow the board
under whose jurisdiction the award was made, or its agents, access to the
books and records of the intervenor to insure that conditions set by the
funding panel are being or have been met. 100 If an intervenor does not
"without reasonable cause" comply with the conditions of a funding
award, the board may order a funded intervenor to "repay to the
proponent the amount of the award, or such part thereof, as the board
may order."101
Funded intervenors are eligible to apply for "supplementary
funding." Application is not made to the funding panel but to the board
hearing the case, and can be made "at any time up to the end of the
hearing."10 2 The board may award supplementary "funding if it is of the
opinion, having regard to all of the circumstances, that the original
award was inadequate."10 3 In making a supplementary funding award,
the board must also consider the criteria set out in s. 714 To date, there
have been few supplementary funding applications. In those cases, the
boards have tried to determine whether an original award was
"inadequate" by looking for circumstances which were unexpected at the
time of, or that have changed since, the original funding award. The
98 Ibid. at ss. 7(3), (5). This limitation has proved problematic in some hearings. Travel costs
for consultants and lawyers are included as part of "fees," but for members of intervenor groups no
travel costs can be reimbursed. This created difficulty for Native participants in the Ontario Hydro
Demand/Supply Plan Environmental Assessment hearing, because they were geographically
dispersed and were required to travel great distances to attend the hearing or meet with their
lawyers and consultants. The Environmental Assessment Board has in some cases treated elders
and in-house staff of environmental groups as "consultants" or "experts" so that their work and
travel could be reimbursed. See Ontario Hydro Supply and Demand Plan Intervenor Funding
Program-Stage 11 (14 December 1990), No. EA-90-01 (EAB) at 26-27. Bogart & Valiante, supra
note 1 at 74.
99JFPA, ibid. ss. 7(3)(b), (c).
100 Mi ss. 7(4) and 9(1).
101 Ibid s. 9(2).
102 /bid. s. 12(1).
103 Ibid.
104bid. s. 12(2). Section 12(2) provides that ss. 7 to 11 apply "with necessary modifications"
to supplementary funding.
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availability of supplementary funding does not provide a licence to spend
beyond one's originally approved budget; it is granted only when new
issues arise, when new witnesses must be called, or when the
presentation of evidence by another party lasts longer than expected./0 5
Supplementary funding should not be used as a way to appeal a funding
panel decision1 °6
In the first three years of the pilot project, $25 million was
awarded as intervenor funding to seventy-one applicants in twenty-two
hearings. Twenty-three million dollars of that total was awarded in the
Ontario Hydro Demand/Supply Plan Environmental Assessment hearing
alone. Because of its complexity, this hearing raises issues which
transcend questions relating simply to intervenor funding.1 07 For
funding applicants in other hearings, the amounts awarded ranged from
$600 to $300,000, with an average award of approximately $50,000, and a
median award of $21,000 at the EA and $30,000 at the oEB.108 From the
information available, these awards seemed reasonable given the
circumstances, and in some instances, seemed low given the nature of
the particular hearing. Proponents are no longer required to disclose
their hearing and project expenditures, so that proportionality does not
now, but certainly could, guide the level of funding awarded.
Submissions from intervenors, boards, and proponents received
as part of the review of the pilot project expressed overwhelming support
for intervenor funding. However, there were a number of reservations
about the operation of the IFPA itself. For example, on one hand, there
is the need to ensure that intervenors are adequately funded, but on the
105 See, for example, Ontario Hydro Supply and Demand Plan Intervenor Funding
Progranm-Stage II, supra note 98; Cnta Gas Ontario-Rates (20 September 1991), No. EBRO 474
(oEB); and Ontario Waste Management Corporation, Supplementary Funding Decision (19 April
1991), No. CH-91-01 (Joint Board).
106 In two cases, supplementary funding applications were made shortly after decisions
denying a desired level of funding. In one, the Board held that there had been no change in
circumstances and denied supplementary funding, in the other, the Board held that the applicants
were entitled to apply for supplementary funding as the circumstances had changed sufficiently. See
letter from J. Santos, Assistant Board Secretary, Environmental Assessment Board to P. Pickfield,
counsel for Greensville Against Serious Pollution [Re Steeley Quarry Products Inc. (26 April 1990),
No. EP-89-04 (EAB)]; and Town of Innirfil Landfil Ruling on Motion for Supplementary Funding
Hearing (23 December 1991), No. CH-91-01 (Joint Board).
10 7 In January 1993, after nearly two years of Ontario Hydro's presentation of evidence and a
significant modification of the undertaking, the proposal was withdrawn from the Board without a
resolution. See discussion in C. Findlay, "Ontario Hydro 'Pulls the Plug' on Demand Supply Plan
Hearing" (1993) 1 DX.E.EA. 153.
108 Bogart & Valiante, supra note I at 95-96.
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other, there is the need to ensure that funds are responsibly expended. 10 9
Severe criticisms of intervenor funding, which question its very
legitimacy, are that it removes the incentive which comes with spending
one's own money and focusing one's participation on only the most
important issues; it primarily benefits lawyers and professional
consultants; it may create a disincentive for proponents, particularly
private sector ones, to proceed with worthwhile projects; and it adds
substantial time to a hearing. These criticisms, however, were not
supported by the vast majority of interests and were not borne out by the
available evidence.110
I. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF FUNDING
Predicting the future of funding is very difficult because there
are contradictory trends emerging. On one hand, the legitimate need for
funding to ensure that access is made effective is widely accepted by
governments, tribunals, and public interest groups. A growing
experience demonstrates the utility of many different funding
mechanisms in accomplishing this goal. On the other hand, however, the
current financial constraints on governments and proponents have
provoked the imposition of stricter limits on some programmes, and a
failure to expand others.
In Canada, the success of the Ontario intervenor funding
experiment will improve the climate for funding. Our recent review of
the pilot project concluded that the IFPA model had met its goals of
increasing the level and quality of interventions in the applicable
proceedings. The Act was then extended for a further four years.111
Intervenor funding may be extended to planning appeals at the Ontario
Municipal Board.112 Other provinces are moving toward their own
funding programmes. The Ontario IFPA model has been recommended
for adoption in Quebec,113 while a variation has been recommended for
109 bid.
110 IbidL at 135 and following.
111 Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General, News Release, "Extension of Intervenor
Funding Project Act Announced" (25 March 1992). The government is expected to "develop
proposals for permanent legislation" following consultation on the review report.
112 See Ontario, Commission on Planning and Development Reform in Ontario, New
Planning for Ontario: Final Report Summary and Recommendations (Toronto: Commission on
Planning and Development Reform, June 1993) at 39-40.
113 Telephone interview with Roderick A. Macdonald (February 1992).
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adoption in Saskatchewan.1 14 British Columbia is including intervenor
funding in its new environmental assessment legislation and Nova Scotia
is conducting an evaluation of different mechanisms. Yet, the IPA, as
currently structured, does have important limits on its transferability to
other administrative schemes. Foremost among these is the need for a
"proponent" who can underwrite the participation of intervenors in
financial need.
The new federal funding programme for environmental
assessment public reviews is another important advance. It is
government rather than proponent funded, but maintains a focus on
need and, therefore, on effectiveness and access. This programme also
recognizes the need for funding in the stages prior to a hearing, while
the other funding mechanisms do not. In addition, the new Alberta
Natural Resources Conservation Board has an expanded costs power,
which includes the power to award costs in advance of a hearing. 15 All
of these new initiatives illustrate that the need for intervenor funding is
widely accepted in Canada.
Balanced against these advances, however, are a number of
retrenchments. Financial pressures are behind the decisions to cancel
the Court Challenges Program; to cancel Ontario Legal Aid funding for
environmental cases; to take the power to award costs away from the
B.C. Utilities Commission; to limit the costs awarded by the Alberta
Public Utilities Board; and to dismantle the U.S. federal agency
compensation programme. Such pressures will also have a powerful
influence on the Ontario government's decision to make the IFPA
permanent, and whether to expand it to other tribunals and other
proceedings.
In looking at these counterweights, it is clear that the future of
funding will require finding a reasonable balance between the rights,
interests, and responsibilities of public interest intervenors, proponents,
and governments. Demands for "responsible funding" or efficient
administration could very likely translate into increased limits on
intervenors, which may in turn undermine the goals of effective access.
To counter this, the Ontario IFPA should be looked to as a useful model
for balancing the interests and responsibilities of different
114 Environmental Challenges, supra note 30 at 49-52.
115Natural Resources Conservation BoardAct supra note 74; and Alta. Reg. 278/91. TheAct
allows for costs to be paid to any "eligible intervenor," that is, one directly affected by a proposal,
expanding beyond the limited power of the Energy Resources Conservation Board.
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participants 1 6 It is important that funding be expanded to ensure
access to administrative proceedings for those who are otherwise unable
to participate effectively, and provided through programmes that are fair
to all parties and protected from arbitrary cancellation.
The focus of these programmes should be on the central
criterion of need. To adopt a "neutral" costs model as the primary
machinery for securing access will not ensure that access is made more
effective. Unlike courts, most tribunals are not engaged in crowning
winners and penalizing losers, but in balancing competing interests and
arriving at a workable outcome consistent with a balanced interpretation
of the "public interest." This is not to say that contribution should not
be a criterion for awarding funds-it is a useful mechanism for
controlling a hearing and ensuring accountability, and should be part of
the funding calculus. Yet, while this is an important principle to
recognize, it should not be the primary determinant of where these
limited funds go; for this is not neutral terrain where all participants are
equally able to participate, nor are these flush times when the use of
funds is not closely scrutinized. It is essential that the goal of access not
be lost in the process.
Of course, it is important not to romanticize devices for citizen
participation in administrative decision making. Not all money awarded
is effectively spent, and vigilance against waste has to be an important
ingredient of such programmes. Nor can participation in the processper
se justify a bad administrative decision, no matter how it is decided in a
particular context. Yet, at a fundamental level, such initiatives can
underscore central aspects of a participatory model of democracy so that
"the sense of citizen dignity is based on having a voice in deciding the
common laws by which members live ... that we as a whole, or
community, decide about ourselves as a whole community."117
116 For example, the IFPA eligibility criteria require inter alia that intervenors raise "public"
rather than private issues and that they be in need of funds in order to qualify for funding. In
addition, there are safeguards to ensure accountability for funds and responsible participation.
Intervenors are generally expected to make a financial contribution, and the limits on "eligible
disbursements" mean that full funding is only possible through a cost award at the end of a hearing,
with costs, of course, limited to those who make a contribution to the hearing. Safeguards for the
proponent include the opportunity to challenge being named a funding proponent.
117Taylor, supra note 6 at 211.
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